DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR:	J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM:	H. Waugh and W. White, Pantex Site Representatives
SUBJECT:	Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending August 4, 2000

DNFSB Activity Summary: W. White was on site all week. H. Waugh was on leave all week. A. Matteucci was on site Monday through Friday to observe the Lightning Protection Master Study. R. West was on site Monday through Friday to observe the DOE Lightning Protection Readiness Assessment. J. Deplitch and L. McGrew were on site Tuesday through Friday to observe the W76 Nuclear Explosive Safety Study (NESS).

<u>W76 D&I Program:</u> A planning meeting for the W76 Readiness Assessment was held on Friday. The Readiness Assessment is scheduled to begin next Monday. One of the major topics for discussion was the lack of available space in the bay during observations. The Readiness Assessment team and the NESS group plan to observe demonstrations simultaneously. With a 25 person maximum (imposed for personnel safety reasons), space will be limited. The DOE/AAO manager has tentatively allotted 9 slots to MHC, 7 to the NESS, 7 to the Readiness Assessment team, 1 to the Board's staff, and 1 to other observers (EH). It is not clear that both the NESS and the Readiness Assessment team will be able to conduct effective, balanced reviews of W76 operations under these conditions.

The W76 NESS began on Monday and will continue next week. The first week was dedicated to briefings on the extensive W76 input document. As discussed above, observations of W76 operations (in conjunction with the Readiness Assessment team) will begin next week. Issues discussed by the NESS group during the first week include the number of units allowed into a facility at one time and force limits on the high explosive during certain hydraulic separation tooling applications.^[II.A]

Lightning Protection: The DOE/AAO readiness assessment team completed field work for reviewing implementation of the Lightning Protection BIO and TSRs. The controls common to the existing JCO and the new BIO, as well as some of the new BIO controls, have been implemented, primarily by engineering procedures. Controls to be implemented after the RA is complete are contained in draft procedures. An implementation plan for the remaining controls contains about 50 actions to be accomplished. A project plan submitted by MHC proposed completing implemented made it difficult for the Readiness Assessment team to evaluate the status of implementation. The most significant issues developed by the Readiness Assessment team include failure to maintain the required stand-off in most facilities and failure to mark several electrical isolation devices to indicate compliance with requirements.

The Nuclear Explosive Safety Study for the Lightning Protection BIO began this week. The study will continue next week with observations of various facilities.^[II.A]

Electrical Safety: MHC concluded its self-assessment of the electrical authority having jurisdiction (EAHJ) program. The final report, issued on Monday, noted that no action had been taken to review and evaluate non-listed electrical equipment, that the EAHJ program is not provided with adequate resources, and that the EAHJ program does not incorporate all relevant areas outlined in DOE's *Electrical Safety Handbook*. ^[II.A]